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1.   Introduction 
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB, the central bank of Hungary) has systematically analysed the fiscal 
stance since the mid-1990s. In a small open economy like Hungary, changes in the fiscal balance are 
likely to have somewhat greater impact on GDP and the external balance than on inflation, so the 
MNB’s fiscal analysis initially focused on medium-term sustainability and the short-term demand 
impact of fiscal policies.  However, with the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in June 2001, the 
assessment of the fiscal impact on aggregate demand has become increasingly important.  
This paper presents the current status of the MNB’s fiscal analysis. Section 2 describes various 
measures of the budget deficit used in Hungary and adjustments to these measures made by the MNB 
in order to calculate a first-round or “headline” indicator of the fiscal impact. Section 3 describes how 
this indicator is decomposed, ie, how the MNB accounts for different factors that determine the change 
in the budget balance. Sections 4 and 5 then describe approaches to assessing the macroeconomic 
impact of changes in the budget balance, first in a partial and then in a general equilibrium setting.  
2.   Measures of the budget deficit and the fiscal impact 
Fiscal impact can in general be defined as the aggregate demand impact of a given change in the 
budget balance. The question is, of course, which definition of the budget balance is appropriate for 
assessing the fiscal impact. Hungary uses three different definitions of the general government deficit, 
shown in Table 1; see MNB (2002): 
•   The deficit based on the IMF’s GFS86 methodology. This was the official definition of the 
deficit until 2002; 
•   The deficit based on the European Union’s ESA95 methodology, which became the official 
definition of the deficit in Hungary starting in 2003; and 
•   The deficit based on an adjusted SNA93 methodology, used by the MNB for analytical 
purposes; see P. Kiss and Szapáry (2000) and MNB (1995).  
 
Table 1 
Budget deficit indicators for Hungary, 1997–2001 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Official deficit (GFS approach) 4.7  4.8  3.7 3.7 3.0 
ESA95 deficit (preliminary calculations) 6.8  8.0 5.5 3.0 4.1 
SNA deficit (MNB-adjusted) 7.0  7.9  6.2 4.1 5.3 
Source: MNB 
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The MNB looks primarily at the SNA deficit, making various adjustments to arrive at a first-round or 
“headline” indicator of the fiscal impact. The adjustments are motivated by the need for flexibility in 
determining the proper classification of public sector activities and the proper time of recording of 
transactions. In particular: 
•   The activities included in public and private sectors should be homogeneous regarding their 
economic objectives and behaviour. The government’s major concern is not maximising 
profits but rather responding to public policy considerations. Corporations engaged in quasi-
fiscal activities or the provision of non-market services are not enforced to respond quickly to 
market signals and should therefore be classified as parts of the government. 
•   Fiscal transactions should be classified as “above” and “below” the line on the basis of their 
effective economic impact, ie, on the basis of the expected behaviour of the recipient. For 
example, government “lending” may have the same effect as transfers if the recipients of 
loans can assume that the government will not in practice enforce its claims. 
•   Cash-based accounts appear to be adequate for recording most revenue and expenditure 
transactions. But in the case of interest expenses, VAT refunds and concession fee receipts, 
it seems sensible to follow the accrual basis of accounting (see Box 1). 
Box 1 
Accrual-based general government accounts  
Since the category of accrual-based deficit was first introduced in the MNB’s 1996 Annual Report, the official 
cash flow-based deficit has been regularly corrected for accrual-based interest rates. Since the compilation of 
the September 1999 issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation, corrections are also applied for certain items of 
the primary balance.  
The need for corrections partly arises because of the need to apply the accrual concept to the VAT, in 
response to the occasional significant discrepancy arising between the accrual-based and the cash flow-based 
VAT figures, where even the sign of the discrepancy shows volatility. This is because the timing of the VAT 
refunds may vary within legally set limits. Furthermore, about half of gross receipts will be refunded. In recent 
years, the discrepancy between accrual-based figures (which reflect underlying processes more closely) and 
cash flow VAT figures has been fluctuating between –0.1% and +0.3% of GDP, depending on whether 
refunding is slower or faster than usual at year-end. This phenomenon was noted in the MNB’s 1996 and 1997 
annual reports.  
The other problem lies in the statistical accounting of lump sum concession payments. Receipts from 
concessions amounted to 35.3 billion forint in 1999, with substantial further payments projected for 2000. In 
terms of the SNA methodology, such concession fees should be accounted for in a similar manner to leases, 
where the use of the accrual concept is required. Accordingly, the accrual-based rent should be separated off 
for the entire period of the lease (concession); in other words, the deficit should be improved each year by the 
sum allocated to it, regardless of the timing of actual payments. Thus, it is not correct to regard lump sum 
concession fees as privatisation receipts and fully deduct them from the receipts. This is because privatisation 
means selling off financial assets (shares) for good, whereas concession only implies the transfer of a right for 
a limited duration, on the expiry of which the right reverts to the state. In principle, there would not be any 
difficulty so long as the concession fee were paid on an annual basis in accordance with the accrual concept. 
However, lump sum payments made in advance or in arrears constitute credit extended either by the party 
granting the concession or the recipient, and credit transactions should be removed from the general 
government deficit. 
Source: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (1999), Box IV.1. 
 
Based on this reasoning, the MNB adjusts three main categories of revenue and expenditure items.  
First, the MNB includes quasi-fiscal activities and road construction financed by the Hungarian 
Development Bank as part of the government. As the MNB has only partial information about these 
activities (gathered, for example, from government resolutions, press releases and, in certain cases, 
through collection of regular data), it can only deal with estimates of the size of these expenditures. 
Second, revenues reported by the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company are 
reclassified in the below-the-line category “reductions in claims” (eg, repayment of debt, disposal of 
shares and off-budget use of privatisation receipts). Forecasting this item is relatively straightforward 
as there are estimates available in the Budget Act and performance of the Privatisation and State 
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Third, VAT and concession fee revenues are adjusted on an accrual basis. Some of the items subject 
to adjustments cannot be observed directly. Consequently, not only the forecast, but also the actual 
performance against the forecast is based on estimates.
2 Estimates of concession fee revenue (which 
are paid in advance as a once-and-for-all payment) are available from the official budget data.  
The MNB strives to keep its adjustments as simple as possible, focusing on the most relevant 
corrections. If the effect of adjustment is constant (ie, it has no trend or volatility) and/or is insignificant 
in size, no adjustment is necessary because it would not affect the estimated change in the deficit. 
Furthermore, when calculating the fiscal impact it is not necessary to analyse separately the balances 
of each subsector of the general government (see Box 2). Thus, one can concentrate on the change in 
adjusted SNA balance at the general government level. 
MNB also strives to keep its adjustments as transparent as possible. The methodology for adjustments 
is published and updated when changes are made, and the time series and forecasts are also made 
available; see MNB (2002). The description of the demand impact shows separately information that is 
publicly available (eg changes in the headline deficit) and the results of analytical SNA corrections. 
Regarding other revenue and expenditure items, MNB’s fiscal forecasts are prepared in a very 
detailed manner, with the budget outcome estimated line by line. The reason is that inflation 
projections cover the forthcoming six to eight quarters, and policy decisions focus on price 
developments expected to take place within the next four to six quarters. The fiscal forecast thus 
requires an approved or at least a draft budget. Without a detailed budget, there is no means of 
assessing the plausibility of revenue or expenditure estimates. The effective horizon for the fiscal 
forecast is thus two to five quarters, except for the years 2001–02, when a two-year budget was 
approved by the Hungarian parliament. 
3.   Factors determining the fiscal impact 
The first step in assessing the impact of changes in the budget balance on aggregate demand is to 
consider which factors have led to a given change in the balance itself, ie, to decompose the fiscal 
impact by its determinants. For this purpose, the MNB distinguishes between indirect and direct 
determinants of the fiscal impact (Table 2). A preliminary step in this analysis is to exclude the effect of 
inflation on the change in the budget balance. 
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Box 2 
Fiscal impact of subsectors of the general government 
Apart from local governments, it is becoming increasingly difficult to analyse the deficits incurred by the 
individual subsectors of general government. Extra-budgetary funds in Hungary underwent major changes in 
both 1996 and 1999, with all but two of them having been integrated into the central government budget. As a 
result, it is no longer possible to compare the time series data on deficits of the central government and extra-
budgetary funds.  
In the past, the social security administration had greater autonomy and only received earmarked transfers 
from the budget. In spite of this apparent autonomy, deficits of autonomous social security funds were on the 
whole financed from the central government budget. To resolve this contradiction, major changes were 
introduced in the management and supervision of the funds in 1998. The autonomous administration 
framework was wound up and management of the funds was transferred to the government. According to the 
law, the deficit of the social security funds is now managed by the central budget. As the size of non-earmarked 
transfers changes from year to year, the exact framework in which the central government deficit is realised 
has become a matter of choice – namely, non-earmarked transfers reduce the social security deficit but raise 
the central government deficit.  
Source: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (1999), Box IV.2. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of change in the budget balance 
 
Real interest payment and balance of 




Inflation effect  1. Excluded from impact on 
budget balance 
2. Indirect impact on 
budget balance 
3. Direct impact on budget 
balance 
 
Since changes in interest rates and profits or losses of the central bank are generally beyond the 
control of fiscal policy, their impact on the budget balance is regarded as indirect. Estimating the 
indirect impact involves separating interest expenditure and including central bank profits or losses in 
the budget. One technical step in this analysis is to smooth the fluctuations in real interest rates.
3  
Direct impact on the budget balance – ie, the impact of factors over which fiscal policy has direct 
influence – is usually much larger. For forecasting and communication purposes, it is useful to 
decompose this impact in three categories; see MNB (2002): 
•   The first category includes the effects of discretionary measures, ie those fiscal policy 
measures that are linked to changes in the tax regime and the non-determined range of 
expenditure.  
•   The second category includes the effects of macroeconomic developments, such as tax 
receipts, employment benefits and pension expenses on account of the indexation system. 
The effects of macroeconomic developments on tax revenue can be calculated by deducting 
the discretionary components. This residual tax revenue excludes all effects of discretionary 
measures and includes all exogenous influences, such as effects of the business cycle and 
changes in inflation, oil prices and exchange rates. 
•  The  third  category,  fiscal developments, is a general term including the effects of all factors 
other than those mentioned in the previous two categories. This residual item is sometimes 
referred to in the literature as the “policy slippage” or “over-performance”. It reflects the 
outcomes of the decisions taken by autonomous local authorities and budgetary units and 
so-called budget chapters. Such decentralised decisions may diverge from intentions of 
policy makers at the central level (the parliament and the central government). This category 
also reflects the effects on the budget of some exogenous factors, such as the number of 
persons eligible for family or health care allowances. 
In practice it is difficult to fully separate the above categories. Discretionary measures affect 
macroeconomic developments, so there is always some overlap between the first two categories. The 
most obvious example is an increase in public sector wages. Taxes paid by the public sector and 
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public sector employees on these wages flow back automatically into general government revenue. In 
this case, it may be justified to account for the effect of discretionary measures on a net basis.  
Knowing which factors determined a given budget outcome is important not only with regard to 
forecasting but also for communication. Differences between actual and budgeted revenues are often 
accumulated year after year as a result of problems with the macroeconomic assumptions of the 
budget. MNB’s estimates of these differences provide an important link between private, government 
and central bank forecasts. They also help analysts to assess fiscal developments in the course of the 
year. Discrepancies between appropriations and actual spending are not so obvious during the year 
because many types of expenditure have no regular seasonal pattern. As a result, the effects of these 
discrepancies on the deficit are usually not estimated or published by the government or private 
analysts. Finally, MNB’s estimates are useful for assessing the effects of adopted across-the-board 
discretionary measures. 
4.   Assessing the fiscal impact, partial approach 
To assess the impact of change in the general government balance on GDP, the external balance and 
inflation, the MNB considers separately elements of fiscal policy that influence two major components 
of aggregate demand: household consumption and government fixed investment.
4 
In particular, the MNB looks at how household consumption is affected by: (1) changes in transfers to 
households (mainly the increase in pensions and, to a lesser extent, changes in social and 
unemployment benefits); (2) changes in the public sector wage bill; and (3) changes in the tax rules 
(tax rates, tax brackets and allowances) that affect household disposable income. Regarding the 
impact of fiscal policy on public investment, the MNB augments public investment with investment 
decided by the government but financed off the budget. This approach is consistent with SNA 
methodology. 
Only some elements of fiscal policy that influence household consumption can be measured on a 
monthly or quarterly basis (eg tax receipts). Many expenditure items do not exhibit regular time 
patterns within the year. This stems from the fact that the objectives and appropriations in the Budget 
Act are set for an entire year and no within-year scheduling is provided in the majority of cases. 
Therefore, the overall fiscal impact is always interpreted on an annual basis.  
5.   Assessing the fiscal impact, general equilibrium approach 
Simulations using a computable general equilibrium model (NIGEM) complement the assessment of 
the fiscal impact on household consumption and government fixed investment.
5 For the purpose of 
simulations, government expenditure is divided in four major categories: government consumption, 
government investment, household transfers and interest payments. Government consumption and 
investment are treated as exogenous policy variables, while transfers depend on nominal income and 
the unemployment rate. As far as the revenue side is concerned, there are three different tax accounts 
in the model: corporate and personal income taxes, which move with nominal GDP; and 
miscellaneous (mainly consumption taxes), which move with nominal consumption. More precisely, 
the personal income tax moves with nominal GDP if the budget balance is at its targeted path. But if 
the budget balance deviates from its target, the model assumes that the personal income tax is 
gradually adjusted to cover the difference. Interest payments by the government depend on the 
existing debt and long-term interest rates, assuming an average maturity of six years. 
Simulations using the NIGEM provide useful information on the dynamics of macroeconomic 
adjustments and the effects of fiscal policy over time. Fiscal policy usually affects macroeconomic 
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performance and the external balance in the short run. In addition, other macroeconomic variables, 
such as inflation, interest rates and exchange rates can be affected. The model estimates the time-
varying response patterns of all these variables. The simulations can simultaneously capture not only 
the direct impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand, but also the structural effects on private 
behaviour, expectations and private decision-making.  
For instance, in assessing the fiscal impact for 2001, the MNB assumed that fiscal expansion would be 
implemented through investment activity, spending on goods and services and a reduction in 
consumption taxes. The NIGEM simulations showed that nearly half of this expansion passed through 
to GDP within a year, and that it led to an increase in the current account deficit. For 2002, the MNB 
assumed that fiscal expansion would be implemented through an increase in public wages and 
transfers to households. The NIGEM simulations showed that this kind of fiscal expansion affected 
GDP in an even shorter time, and had a relatively longer and stronger impact on external deficits; see 
MNB (2001).  
Comparing preliminary data on budget outturns for 2001 and 2002 with the results of MNB simulations 
indicates that the actual effects on aggregate demand were smaller than indicated by the model. This 
is partly the result of deviations in fiscal policy from the model assumptions. For instance, capital 
expenditure failed to pick up speed at the expected rate in 2001, while it increased in 2002 at a rate 
much higher than assumed. By contrast, a portion of the increase in wages and household transfers 
assumed for 2002 was brought forward to 2001. As a result, the impact of fiscal expansion on GDP 
was much larger in 2002 than had been projected by the model in November 2001. The larger fiscal 
expansion led to higher public wages and thus an additional increase (rather than a moderation) in 
spending on goods and services. The updated simulations substantiated earlier calculations that fiscal 
expansion impairs the external balance but has a relatively moderate effect on inflation. However, due 
to the size of overall expansion in aggregate demand in 2001–03, inflation in 2003–04 could 
accelerate by more than 1 percentage point compared with previous projections; see MNB (2003). 
6.   Conclusion 
This paper has outlined the current state of fiscal analysis at the MNB from the perspective of 
monetary policy. Many further analytical challenges lie ahead. A new general equilibrium model based 
on quarterly data is being developed to improve forecasting. This model should help to separate better 
the macroeconomic effects from the effects of discretionary measures. Greater transparency and 
better communication of the results of MNB analysis are also required. For example, MNB should 
explain why it employs the corrected SNA indicator instead of the official ESA95 indicator of the 
budget balance. Analysis of other aspects of fiscal policy, such as sustainability, should also receive 
more emphasis in the years ahead. 
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